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Abstract. Although practised as an art and science for ages, cryptog-
raphy had to wait until the mid-twentieth century before Claude Shannon
gave it a strong mathematical foundation. However, Shannon’s approach
was rooted is his own information theory, itself inspired by the classical
physics of Newton and Einstein. But our world is ruled by the laws of
quantum mechanics. When quantum-mechanical phenomena are taken
into account, new vistas open up both for codemakers and codebreakers.
Is quantum mechanics a blessing or a curse for the protection of privacy?
As we shall see, the jury is still out!
Keywords: Cryptography, Quantum mechanics, Quantum computa-
tion, Post-quantum cryptography, Quantum communication, Quantum
key distribution, Edgar Allan Poe
1 Introduction
For thousands of years, cryptography has been an ongoing battle between code-
makers and codebreakers [1,2], who are more formally called cryptographers and
cryptanalysts. Naturally, good and evil are subjective terms to designate code-
makers and codebreakers. As a passionate advocate for the right to privacy, my
allegiance is clearly on the side of codemakers. I admit that I laughed hyster-
ically when I saw the Zona Vigilada warning that awaits visitors of the Plac¸a
de George Orwell near City Hall in Barcelona [3]. Nevertheless, I recognize that
codebreakers at Bletchley Park during the Second World War were definitely on
the side of good. We all know about the prowess of Alan Turing, who played
a key role at the routine (this word is too strong) decryption of the German
Enigma cipher [4]. But who remembers Marian Rejewski, who actually used
pure (and beautiful) mathematics to break Enigma with two colleagues before
the War even started? [5] Indeed, who remembers except yours truly and nation-
alistic Poles such as my friend Artur Ekert? Certainly not filmmakers! [6] And
who remembers William Tutte, who broke the much more difficult Lorenz ci-
pher (codenamed Tunny by the Allies), which allowed us to probe the mind of
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Hitler? [7] Tutte moved on to found the Computer Science department at the
University of Waterloo, Canada, now home of IQC, the Institute for Quantum
Computation, but never said a word until the 1990s about how he won the War
for us [8]. The Canadian Communications Security Establishment pays homage
with its Tutte Institute for Mathematics and Computing. But who else remem-
bers those silent heroes on the codebreaking side? I am getting carried away
by emotions as I type these words while flying from To¯kyo¯ to Calgary, on my
way home after the amazingly successful 5th Annual Conference on Quantum
Cryptography, QCrypt 2015 [9].
Regardless of the side to which good belongs, the obvious question is: Who
will win the battle between codemakers and codebreakers? More specifically, how
do the recent advances in Quantum Information Science (QIS) change this age-
old issue? Until the mid-twentieth century, History has taught us that code-
makers, no matter how smart, have been systematically outsmarted by code-
breakers, but it ain’t always been easy. For instance, le chiffre inde´chiffrable,
usually attributed to Blaise de Vigene`re in 1585, but actually invented by Giovan
Batista Belaso 32 years earlier, remained invulnerable until broken by Charles
Babbage more than three centuries after its invention. (Baggage is best known for
the Analytical Engine, which would have been the first programmable computer
had the technology of his days been able to rise up to the challenge.) The appar-
ent upper hand of codebreakers, despite the still enduring invulnerability of the
chiffre inde´chiffrable, prompted American novelist and high-level amateur crypt-
analyst Edgar Allan Poe to confidently declare in 1841 that “It may be roundly
asserted that human ingenuity cannot concoct a cipher which human ingenuity
cannot resolve” [10]. Poe, do I need to mention, was among other things the
author of The Gold-Bug [11], published in June 1843. This extraordinary short
story centring on the decryption of a secret message was instrumental on kindling
the career of prominent cryptographers, such as William Friedman’s, America’s
foremost cryptanalyst of a bygone era, who read it as a child [12, p. 146].
Cryptography was set on a firm scientific basis by Claude Shannon, the father
of information theory [13], as the first half of the twentieth century was coming
to a close [14]. Actually, it’s likely that his groundbreaking work was achieved
several years earlier but kept classified due to the War effort. In any case, Shan-
non’s theory was resolutely set in the context of classical physics. In retrospect,
this is odd since it was clearly established at that time that Nature is ruled
not by the Laws envisioned centuries earlier by Sir Isaac Newton, and not even
by those more modern of Albert Einstein, but by the counterintuitive features
of the emerging quantum mechanics. Shannon was well aware of this revolu-
tion in physics, but he probably did not think it relevant to the foundations of
information theory, which he developed as a purely abstract theory.
In particular, Shannon did not question the “fact” that encrypted infor-
mation transmitted from a sender (codenamed Alice) to a receiver (codenamed
Bob) could be copied by an eavesdropper (codenamed Eve) without causing
any disturbance noticeable by Alice and Bob. From this unfounded assumption,
Shannon proved a famous theorem according to which perfect secrecy requires
Cryptography in a Quantum World 3
the availability of a shared secret key as long as the message that Alice wishes
to transmit securely to Bob, or more precisely as long as the entropy of that
message, and that this key cannot be reused [14]. This theorem is mathematically
impeccable, but it is nevertheless irrelevant in our quantum-mechanical world
since the assumption on which its proof is based does not hold.
My purpose is to investigate the issue of whether or not Poe was right in
his sweeping mid-nineteenth century statement. Could it be indeed that code-
breakers will continue to have the upper hand over codemakers for the rest of
eternity?
2 The Case of Classical Codemakers against Classical
Codebreakers
The first electronic computers were designed and built to implement Tutte’s
beautiful mathematical theory on how to break the high-level German code
during World War II. They were codenamed the Colossus and ten of them
were built in Bletchley Park [15]. As mentioned in the Introduction, they were
instrumental in allowing us to win the War. However, in order to secure secrecy of
the entire Bletchley Park operation, they were smashed to bits (funny expression
when it concerns computers!) once the War was over. Consequently, I “learned”
as a child that the first electronic computer in history had been the American
Eniac, when in fact it was the eleventh! Little did the pioneers of the Colossus
imagine that, by an ironic twist of fate, they had unleashed the computing
power that was to bring (temporary?) victory to the codemakers. In a sense,
codebreakers had been the midwife of the instrument of their own destruction.
Perhaps. Indeed, the rise of public-key cryptography in the 1970s had led us to
believe that an increase in computing power could only be in favour of code-
makers, hence at the detriment of codebreakers.
But well before all this took place, a cryptographic method that offers perfect
secrecy, which later came to be known as the one-time pad, had already been
invented in the nineteenth century. It is usually attributed to Gilbert Vernam,
who was granted a US Patent in 1919 [16]. However, according to prime historian
David Kahn, Vernam had not realized the crucial importance of never using the
same key twice until Joseph Mauborgne pointed it out [1, p. 398]. But it was
later discovered that the one-time pad had been invented 35 years earlier by
Frank Miller, a Sacramento banker [17]. Its perfect security was demonstrated
subsequently by Shannon [14]. In any case, the one-time pad requires a secret
key as long as the message to be transmitted, which makes it of limited prac-
tical use. It was nevertheless used in real life, for instance on the red telephone
between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during the Cold War [18], as
well as between Fidel Castro and Che Guevara after the latter had left Cuba for
Bolivia [19]. But in our current information-driven society, we need a process by
which any two citizens can enjoy confidential communication. For this, a method
to establish a shared secret key is required. Could this be achieved through an
authentic public channel, which offers no protection against eavesdropping?
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The first breakthrough in the academic world came to Ralph Merkle in 1974,
who designed a scheme capable of providing a quadratic advantage to code-
makers over codebreakers. Merkle’s scheme is secure under the sole assumption
(still unproven to this day) that some problems can only be solved by exhaustive
search over their space of potential solutions. At the time, Merkle was a grad-
uate student at the University of California in Berkeley, enrolled in a computer
security class. Unable to make his ideas understood by his professor, Merkle
“dropped the course, but kept working on the idea” [20]. After several years,
he prevailed and his landmark paper was finally published [21]. However, Whit-
field Diffie, a graduate student “next door”, at Stanford University, had similar
ideas independently, albeit shortly after Merkle. But Diffie was lucky enough
to have an advisor, Martin Hellman, who understood the genius of his student.
Together, they made the concepts of public-key cryptography and digital signa-
ture immensely popular [22], two years before Merkle’s publication.
A few years later, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, inspired
by the Diffie-Hellman breakthrough, proposed an implementation of public-key
cryptography and digital signatures that became known to all as the RSA crypto-
system [23]. And thus, history was made. The fact that the RSA cryptosystem
had in fact been invented in 1973 by Clifford Cocks [24], at the British secret ser-
vices known as GCHQ, is of little relevance to the practical importance of the dis-
covery on what was to become the Internet. As long as the factorization of large
numbers remained infeasible, the codemakers had finally won the battle, proving
Poe wrong. Soon, electronic safety all over the Internet revolved around this RSA
cryptosystem, as well as the earlier invention known as the Diffie-Hellman key
establishment protocol [22]. At about the same time, Robert McEliece invented
another approach, based on error-correction codes [25], which did not come into
practical use because it required much longer keys than either the RSA or the
Diffie-Hellman solution. Later, the same apparent level of security was obtained
with significantly shorter keys by bringing in the number-theoretic notion of
elliptic curves [26,27]. And the Internet was a happy place. Or so it seemed.
End of story?
3 The Unfair but Realistic Case of Classical Codemakers
against Quantum Codebreakers
End of story? Not quite! In the early 1980s, Richard Feynman [28,29] and, in-
dependently, David Deutsch [30], invented the theoretic notion of a quantum
computer. This hypothetical device would use the counterintuitive features of
quantum mechanics for computational purposes. At first, it was not clear that
quantum computers, even if they could be built, could speed up calculations.
And then, in 1994, Peter Shor [31], and independently Alexis Kitaev [32],
discovered that quantum computers have the power to factor large numbers
and extract discrete logarithms efficiently, bringing to their knees not only the
RSA cryptosystem but also the Diffie-Hellman key establishment scheme, even
if based on elliptic curves. As a society, we are extremely fortunate that Shor’s
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and Kitaev’s discoveries were made before a quantum computer had already been
built for some other purposes (such as computational physics and chemistry).
Quite literally, this saved civilization from catastrophic collapse. But now that
we have known about the looming threat for over two decades, surely we are
active at deploying solutions that have at least a fighting chance to withstand
the onslaught of a quantum computer.
Well, not really. :-(
The general apathy towards the quantum threat to worldwide security on the
Internet and beyond is quite simply appalling. Why react today (or more appro-
priately twenty years ago) when we can quietly wait for disaster? After all, no
serious business model looks more than five years in the future, and it would be
expensive to change the current cryptographic infrastructure. And indeed, a full-
scale quantum computer is unlikely to materialize in the next five years. Except
perhaps in an ultra-secret basement somewhere, be it governmental of indus-
trial. . . But when (not “if ”) this happens, all past communications will become
insecure to whomever was wise enough to have stored the Internet traffic that
was until then undecipherable. The fact that current cryptographic techniques
are susceptible to being broken retroactively is their main conceptual weakness.
Any secret entrusted to them today, even if it is indeed currently secure (some-
thing that we do not know how to prove), will be exposed as soon as a sufficiently
large quantum computer becomes operational.
So, was Poe right after all? Are codebreakers poised to regain their upper
hand? Not necessarily! Alternative encryption methods have been designed,
which are not (yet) known to be vulnerable to a quantum attack, ironically
including the historical McEliece approach [25], which had been scorned upon its
invention because of the length of its keys. More recent approaches based on hash
functions, short vectors in lattices and multivariate polynomials are being vigor-
ously investigated. The emerging field of post-quantum cryptography is devoted
to the study of (hopefully) quantum-resistant encryption [33,34]. Unfortunately,
we cannot prove that any of these alternatives is secure, but at least they are not
already known to be compromised by the advent of a quantum computer. Well, in
the case of lattice-based cryptography [35], this is not so clear anymore [36,37,38].
But one thing is sure: we cannot hope to be protected by these techniques if we
don’t use them! On the other hand, some of these more recent schemes could in
fact be less secure than RSA against a classical attack, simply because they have
not yet stood the test of time. Therefore, a transition to these new techniques
should be carried out with the utmost care. But it must be carried out.
Michele Mosca likes to tell the following tale. Let x denote the length of time
(in years) that you want your secrets to remain secret. Let y denote the time
it will take to re-tool the current infrastructure with quantum-safe encryption
(assuming that such a thing actually exists). Let z denote the time it will take
before a full-scale quantum computer is operational. Mosca’s “theorem” tells us
that if x+ y > z, then it is time to panic! Sadly, it may even be that y > z,
meaning that it’s already too late to avoid a complete meltdown of the Internet.
So, what are we waiting for?
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It turns out that the American National Security Agency (NSA) is taking
this threat very seriously indeed. This last August (2015), they issued a directive
called “Cryptography Today” in which they announced that they “will initiate
a transition to quantum resistant algorithms in the not too distant future” [39].
Most significantly, they wrote: “For those partners and vendors that have not
yet made the transition to Suite B elliptic curve algorithms, we recommend not
making a significant expenditure to do so at this point but instead to prepare for
the upcoming quantum resistant algorithm transition”. Said plainly, even though
elliptic-curve cryptography is believed to be more secure than first-generation
public key solutions against classical cryptanalysis, it is no longer considered
to offer sufficient long-term security under the looming threat of a quantum
computer to be worth implementing at this point. It’s nice to see that someone
is paying attention. For once, I’m glad that the NSA is listening! :-)
From a theoretical perspective, despite what I wrote above, it is possible
to have provably quantum-safe encryption under the so-called random oracle
model, which is essentially the model that was used by Merkle in his original
1974 invention of public key establishment [20]. In a classical world, this model
roughly corresponds to the assumption that there are problems that can only
be solved by exhaustive search over their space of potential solutions. In the
quantum setting, exhaustive search can be replaced by a celebrated algorithm
due to Lov Grover, which offers a quadratic speedup [40], but no more [41].
Recall that Merkle’s original idea brought a quadratic advantage to code-
makers over codebreakers. But since Grover’s algorithm offers a quadratic
speedup to codebreakers, this completely offsets the codemakers’ advantage.
As a result, codebreakers can find the key established by codemakers in the same
time it took to establish it! [42] The obvious reaction is to let the codemakers
use quantum powers as well, but please remember that in this section, we con-
sider quantum codebreakers but only classical codemakers. Nevertheless, I have
discovered with Peter Høyer, Kassem Kalach, Marc Kaplan, Sophie Laplante
and Louis Salvail that Merkle’s idea can be modified in a way that if the code-
makers are willing to expend an effort proportional to some parameter N, they
can obtain a shared key that cannot be discovered by a quantum codebreaker
who is not willing to expend an effort proportional to N7/6 [43]. As I said, this
is purely theoretical because it is not possible to argue that such an advan-
tage offers practical security. Indeed, N would have to be astronomical before
a key that is obtained in, say, one second would require more than one year of
codebreaking work. In contrast, Merkle’s quadratic advantage is significant for
reasonably small values of N. Nevertheless, our work should be seen as a proof
of principle. Now that we know that some security is possible in the unfair case
of classical codemakers against quantum codebreakers, it is worth trying to do
better (or prove that it is not possible).
Coming back to the question asked at the end of the Abstract, quantum
mechanics appears to be a curse for the protection of privacy in this unfair
context, which is hardly surprising since only codebreakers were assumed to
use it!
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4 Allowing Codemakers to Use Quantum Computation
The previous section considered a realistic scenario in which simple citizens want
to protect their information against a much more powerful adversary. Indeed, it is
likely that quantum computers will initially be available only to large governmen-
tal, industrial and criminal organizations. Furthermore, it is safe cryptographic
practice to assume that your adversary is computationally more powerful (and
possibly also more clever) than you are.
Nevertheless, in the more distant future, one can imagine a world in which
quantum computers are as ubiquitous as classical computers are today. When
this happens, codemakers will no longer be limited to classical computing.
Can this restore the balance? Or even better, could the availability of quan-
tum computers turn out to be to the advantage of codemakers, just as had been
the availability of ever increasing classical computational power since the in-
ception of public-key cryptography in the mid-1970s? Unfortunately, I am not
aware of any encryption technique that would benefit from quantum computa-
tion sufficiently to offset the benefits that quantum computation would bestow
on codebreakers.
For instance, it is easy to partially repair Merkle’s approach [42] if the code-
makers are also allowed to use Grover’s algorithm, or more precisely a variant
known as BBHT [44]. Having expended an effort proportional to N in order to
obtain a shared key, they can create a puzzle on which classical codebreakers
would have to expend an effort proportional to N3, a clear improvement over
the quadratic advantage of the original classical Merkle approach. However, a
quantum codebreaker would simply use Grover’s algorithm to obtain the key
after an effort proportional to N3/2. This is not a complete break, but this
quantum scheme is not as secure as Merkle’s original would have been against a
classical adversary. So, we see that quantum-mechanical powers have helped the
codebreakers more than the codemakers. Can codemakers use quantum powers
in a more clever manner? Well, we have developed a less obvious Merkle-like
quantum key establishment scheme against which a quantum codebreaker needs
to spend a time proportional to N7/4 [43]. This is still not quite the quadratic
advantage that was possible in an all-classical world, but it is reasonably close
and possibly secure enough to be used in practice.
Nevertheless, quantummechanics still appears to be a curse for the protection
of privacy even when codemakers are also allowed to make use of it.
5 Allowing Codemakers to Use Quantum Communication
Until now, we had restricted all communication between codemakers to be clas-
sical. It turns out that quantum communication comes with a great advantage
because of the no-cloning theorem [45], which says that the state of elemen-
tary particles cannot be copied even in principle. This is precisely what causes
the demise of the “famous” theorem by Shannon mentioned at the end of the
Introduction. Quantum information transmitted between codemakers cannot be
copied by an eavesdropper without causing a detectable disturbance.
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Inspired by an unpublished manuscript written by Steven Wiesner in April
1968, while he was participating in the Columbia University student protests [46],
Charles Bennett and I realized in 1982 that quantum mechanics provides us with
a channel on which passive eavesdropping is impossible. This led us and Seth
Breidbart to a write down what would become the leitmotif of the nascent field
of quantum cryptography.
When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons, are used
to transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel
cryptographic phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission media,
e.g. a communications channel on which it is impossible in principle to
eavesdrop without a high probability of being detected. [47]
Armed with this idea, we devised a cryptographic protocol in which a one-time
pad could be safely reused indefinitely, as long as no eavesdropping is detected.
This secure reuse of a one-time pad is precisely what Shannon had mathemati-
cally demonstrated to be impossible: all security is lost as soon a “one-time” pad
is used twice. Our advantage, of course, comes from the fact that we could detect
eavesdropping and discontinue the use of a pad as soon as it had been compro-
mised (yet providing perfect secrecy even on the last message that was sent),
whereas he had no fundamental way to detect eavesdropping, and therefore he
was forced to play safe.
In more detail, Shannon proved that the one-time pad is unconditionally
secure provided the shared key is perfectly random, completely unknown of the
eavesdropper, and used once only. However, even though no information leaks
concerning the message in case of interception, information would leak concern-
ing the key itself. This is of no consequence as long as the key is never reused.
But if it is, the key-secrecy condition is no longer fulfilled the second time,
which is why the system becomes insecure. It follows that a “one-time” pad
can be reused safely, Shannon’s theorem notwithstanding, provided the previous
communications have not been subject to eavesdropping, and it remains secure
the first time that it is.
Expounding on these ideas, we wrote our paper on “How to re-use a one-time
pad safely” in 1982 and had it published. . . a few months ago, 25 years later! [47].
The reason it took so long to publish is that as soon as it was about to be
rejected from the Fifteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
Bennett and I had a much better idea: we realized that it is more practical to
use the quantum channel to establish a shared secret random key, and then use
this key as a classical one-time pad to encode the actual message, rather than
use the channel to transmit the message directly. The main advantage of this
indirect approach is that even if most of the quantum information is lost in the
channel—indeed, optical fibres are not very transparent to single photons over
several kilometres—a random subset of a random key is still a (shorter) random
key. In contrast, a small random subset of a meaningful message is fairly likely
to be mostly random and totally useless.
Thus was born Quantum Key Distribution, which is now called simply QKD.
We presented QKD for the first time at the 1983 IEEE International Symposium
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on Information Theory [48], but each paper was allowed only a one-page abstract.
Consequently, our protocol had to wait another year before it could be published
in the Proceedings of a conference held in Bengalu¯ru, India, where I had been
invited to present any paper of my choice [49]. I suspected that the idea of
QKD was likely to be rejected if submitted to a conference with full published
proceedings, which is why I seized the opportunity provided by a blank-cheque
invitation to sneak it at that conference! This is how our original QKD protocol
came to be known as “BB84”, where the Bs stand for the authors, despite the
fact that we had invented and presented it in 1983. Thirty years later, Natural
Computing (Springer) and Theoretical Computer Science (Elsevier) decided to
join forces and publish special BB84 commemorative issues. This is how the
earlier 1982 paper came to be published [47], whereas the original “BB84 paper”
was published for the first time in a journal [50]. For more information on the
early history of quantum cryptography, please read Ref. [51].
It was fairly easy to show that BB84 is secure against the most obvious
attacks that an eavesdropper might attempt [52]. However, it took ten years after
its invention before a complete formal proof of unconditional security, taking into
account any attack possible according to the laws of quantum mechanics, was
obtained [54]. Well, not exactly. This early proof, as well as the few that followed
for the purpose of simplifying it, contained a major oversight. They proved that
the key established by BB84 (and other similar QKD protocols) was perfectly
secret. . . provided it is never used! Indeed, Renato Renner and Robert Ko¨nig
realized ten years later that a clever adversary could keep the eavesdropped
information at the quantum level (unmeasured). Later, when the key is used,
say as one-time pad, the information that it leaks on the key (which would not
be a problem in classical cryptography since the key would not be reused) could
inform the eavesdropper about the appropriate measurement to make in order
to learn more of the key and, therefore something about the message itself [55].
At first, this was only a theoretical worry, but then it was shown that the danger
is real because one could purposely design a QKD scheme that could be proved
secure under the old definition, but that really leaked information if the “secret”
key is used [56]. Fortunately, the adequate (“composable”) definition was given
and BB84 was correctly proven secure a few months later [57].
Et voila`! Quantum cryptography offers an unbreakable method for code-
makers to win the battle once and for all against any possible attack available to
codebreakers, short of violating the widely accepted laws of physics. Despite the
discouraging news brought about by the previous sections, in which quantum
mechanics appeared to be a curse for codemakers, in the end it is a blessing for
the protection of privacy.
As my much missed dear friend Asher Peres once said, “The quantum
taketh away and the quantum giveth back”. Indeed, quantum mechanics can be
exploited to break the cryptography that is currently deployed over the world-
wide Internet, via Shor’s algorithm, but quantum mechanics has also provided
us with the ultimately secure solution. (To be historically exact, the quantum
giveth “back” ten years before it taketh away!)
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Poe was wrong. End of story!
Oh well. . . Not so fast. Poe was wrong in theory. Now, one has to build
an apparatus that implements QKD as specified by the theoretical protocol.
Exactly? Not possible! Any real implementation will be at best an approximation
of the ideal protocol. The first prototype was built by Bennett and me, with the
help of three students (two of whom have become highly respected researchers
in the field) as early as 1989, even though the journal paper was published a
few years later [52,53]. This prototype was not intended to be more than a proof
of principle and some of its parts made such loud noises that we could literally
hear the bits fly by. . . and zeroes did not make the same noise as ones. So, this
first implementation was secure provided the eavesdropper is deaf!
Afterwards, serious experimental physicists entered the game and ever
increasingly sophisticated devices have been built, capable of establishing secret
keys over longer and longer distances. This business became so serious that
companies sprung up to market QKD equipment, such as ID Quantique [58]
in Switzerland. China has recently announced that it has almost completed the
installation of a quantum communications network stretching two thousand kilo-
metres from Beijing to Shanghai [59]. Several countries have plans to move the
quantum highway to space, so that distances will no longer be an issue.
In the mean time, a new breed of (typically friendly) pirates has sprung up:
the Quantum Hackers. In 2009, a team lead by Vadim Makarov completed a
“full-field implementation of a complete attack on a running QKD connection;
an installed eavesdropper obtained the entire ‘secret’ key, while none of the
parameters monitored by the legitimate parties indicated a security breach” [60].
Of course, this was not an attack against BB84 or any other provably secure QKD
protocol, which would have been an attack against quantum mechanics itself:
this was an attack against one particular imperfect implementation of a perfect
idea. The specific flaw was eradicated. . . and Makarov found another weakness!
And so, the game of cat and mouse between codemakers and codebreakers
continues. Only the battlefield has shifted from the realm of mathematics and
computer science to the realm of physics and engineering. Nevertheless, even
an imperfect implementation of QKD has a significant advantage over classical
systems: it must be attacked while the key establishment process is taking place.
There is nothing to store for subsequent codebreaking when new technology or
new algorithms become available. If the technology is available today for the
implementation of some imperfect version of QKD but not yet for breaking it,
everlasting security is achievable. Similarly, I have not mentioned the fact that
the deployment of QKD requires the availability of an authenticated classical
channel between the codemakers to avoid a person-in-the-middle attack, much as
was the case for Merkle’s classical approach in 1974. However, if the codemakers
can establish short-lived secure authentication keys by any method, those keys
can give rise to everlasting security through the use of QKD, again an advantage
that has no classical counterpart [61].
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to wonder if there is any hope of one day building
an implementation of QKD so close to the ideal protocol that it will effectively be
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secure against all possible attacks, regardless of the codebreaker’s technology and
computing time? It is tempting to say that this would be Mission: Impossible.
Surely, an army of Makarovs will spring up with increasingly clever ideas to
defeat increasingly sophisticated (yet imperfect) implementations of QKD. Said
otherwise, surely Poe was right in the end.
Well. . . Maybe not! A new approach to QKD has sprung up, based on a
brilliant idea put forward by Artur Ekert as early as 1991 [62]. Instead of basing
the security of QKD on the impossibility of cloning quantum information—more
fundamentally the impossibility of obtaining classical information on a quantum
system without disturbing it [63]—Ekert’s idea was to base the security of QKD
on violations of Bell inequalities [64] in entangled nonlocal quantum systems [65].
Even though Ekert’s original 1991 QKD protocol cannot give rise to an apparatus
that would be more secure than one based on BB84 [63], his fundamentally
revolutionary idea opened the door to other theoretical QKD protocols that
have the potential to be secure even if implemented imperfectly. The security
of those so-called “device-independent QKD protocols” would depend only on
the belief that information cannot travel faster than light, that the codemakers
are capable of choosing their own independent randomness, and of course that
they live in secure private spaces (since there is no need for codebreakers if the
adversary is capable to physically eavesdrop over the codemakers’ shoulders!).
In the extreme case, highly theoretical device-independent QKD protocols have
been designed whose security does not even depend on the validity of quantum
mechanics itself! A recent survey of this approach is found in Ref. [66].
The catch is that the implementation of fully device-independent QKD proto-
cols represents formidable technological challenges. It is not clear that we shall
ever reach the required sophistication to turn this dream into reality. Never-
theless, a first essential step towards this goal has been achieved very recently
by Ronald Hanson and collaborators in the Netherlands when they performed a
long-awaited experiment in which they closed both the locality and the detection
loopholes in experimental violations of Bell inequalities [67,68].
Shall we ever be able to build such a device? If so, the codemakers will have
the final laugh. But what if not?
Was Poe right in the end? The jury is still out!
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